To construct and operate a nuclear research reactor, authorization is required to be obtained by the licensee from the Regulatory Body. One of the tasks of the regulatory authority is to verify that the performed Safety Analysis fulfils the safety requirements. Historically, the compliance with safety requirements was assessed using a deterministic approach and conservative assumptions. This provides sufficient safety margins with respect to the licensing limits on boundary and operational conditions. Conservative assumptions were introduced into the framework of the safety analysis to account for the uncertainty associated with lack of knowledge. With the introduction of best estimate computational tools, safety analyses are usually carried out using best estimate approach. Results of such analysis can be accepted by the Regulatory Authority only if appropriate uncertainty evaluation is conducted. Best Estimate (BE) computer codes are capable of providing more realistic information on the status of the plant, allowing the prediction of the real safety margins.
INTRODUCTION
IAEA safety requirements publication GS-R-1 recommend that prior to the granting of authorization, the licensee shall submit a detailed safety analysis of the plant to the regulatory body in accordance with clearly defined procedures. The regulatory authority needs to certify that the Safety Analysis has captured relevant postulated initiating event analysis that may pose risk to the facility, the staff of the facility, the public and the environment [1] .
Although conservative assumptions may largely be valid for designing equipment and safety analysis, they may not provide the operational and systematic insight necessary to support safe operation and maintenance, unlike realistic approach.
An improved computing power, and also increase of knowledge about plant phenomena, had helped in carrying out most safety analyses using Best Estimate (BE) system codes. The results of such analysis are accepted by the regulatory authority only if an appropriate evaluation of the uncertainty related to the results is provided. The advantage is that these codes provide more realistic information on the status of the plant, which allows direct measure or prediction of the "real" safety margins if the uncertainty is considered. Knowledge of the real operational and transient conditions allows the operator to increase the performances of the plant without decreasing the safety margins. Currently, the BEPU approach is only connected with Nuclear Power plants (NPP), and only with accident analysis. In the future the same approach can be extended to the entire nuclear reactor safety process and to any nuclear installation including the Research Reactors.
BEPU APPROACH
The use of conservative tools and hypothesis in evaluation of safety limits of nuclear reactors has limitations due to the current trend of industries to increase power production and limit economic losses due to uncertainties. BEPU approach tries to address this issue since it is based on realistic data and advance numerical tools and methods, which is a direct measure of safety margin of the plant. This same approach can be applied in research reactors to address the safety margin issues and uncertainties in their safety analysis. Application of BEPU approach to research reactors can be based on the existing BEPU methodology for NPPs, as shown in Figure 1 , without reinventing the whole process again.
Recently, application of BEPU is receiving much attention in nuclear reactor safety analysis. In comparison with conservative methodologies, BEPU adopt best estimate codes and realistic input data with uncertainties to quantify the limiting values, such as peak cladding temperature (PCT) for loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs) [2] . It does not only rely on just application of the best estimate codes, but also on factors such as evaluation of the computer code models uncertainty, and conservative assumptions on boundary and initial conditions, and on the availability of system components [3] . BEPU has been identified by some organizations to be more comprehensive method for licensing process. Even though it has never been applied on research reactors it can be a good approach for quantifying safety margins as well as preparation of Emergency Operational Procedures (EOP) [4] .
As a recent example, within the licensing process of the NPP Atucha II PHWR (Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor), the BEPU approach has been selected for issuing of the Chapter 15 on FSAR (Final Safety Analysis Report). Slovak Nuclear Regulatory Authority (UJD SR) guides for safety analysis also recommend the application of combined or best estimate plus uncertainty approach when performing the deterministic safety analysis to support the licensing process [5] [6] . The BEPU approach has also been adopted by some vendors. Westinghouse proposed a methodology named Automated Statistical Treatment of Uncertainty Method (ASTRUM) for realistic large break LOCA (LBLOCA) analysis. AREVA implemented the GRS method to evaluate the convolution of LBLOCA uncertainty contributors to PCT [7] [8] .
At the moment, conservative and combined approaches are widely used, compared to BEPU, due to lack of adequate knowledge to execute all the procedures involved in the use of BEPU approach.
BEPU principles
The process of the BEPU approach does not differ significantly from the combined approach. They are similar in the selection and in the classification of the events, acceptance criteria, availability of systems and components, operator action and user effect, presentation and evaluation of results and quality assurances. The differences are the use of nominal values (Best Estimate) as initial boundary conditions, and secondly, evaluation of the uncertainty associated with calculations.
The proposed BEPU approach follows current practices on deterministic accident analyses, but it also includes some key features to address particular needs of the application. The approach takes credit of the concept of Evaluation Models (EM), and comprising three separate possible modules depending on the application purposes: Therefore, qualification of the nodalization has been divided in two separate processes: steady state and on-transient.
In principle, whenever a best estimate method is applied for licensing purposes, uncertainty quantification is required. In reality, results of code calculations do not give exact information on the behavior of a nuclear reactor during postulated accident scenarios simulation. Therefore, best estimate predictions of plant scenarios must be supplemented by uncertainty evaluations in order to be meaningful. The Code Scaling, Applicability, And Uncertainty (CSAU) evaluation methodology was developed by the United State Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), its contractors, and consultants. CSAU's purpose is to address, in a unified and systematic manner, questions related to the scaling capability of a best-estimate code, to its applicability to scenarios of interest to NPP safety studies, and to the evaluation of uncertainties in calculating parameters of interest when the code is used to perform a calculation for a specified scenario and NPP design. CSAU is a systematic procedure that leads to a quantified evaluation of code calculation uncertainty [9] .
The Uncertainty Method based on Accuracy Extrapolation (UMAE) is the prototype method for the consideration of "the propagation of code output errors" approach for uncertainty evaluation. The method focuses not on the evaluation of individual parameter uncertainties but on the propagation of errors from a suitable database calculating the final uncertainty by extrapolating the accuracy from relevant integral experiments. To ensure the best use of the code in predicting the reactor behavior, extrapolation of accuracy is calculated by finding the differences between measured and calculated quantities of the reactor.
DESCRIPTION OF THE EXPERIMENTAL FACILITY

Description of GHARR-1
The n.cm −2 .s −1 in the inner irradiation channels of the annular reflector. It has only one control rod. As part of the ongoing global effort to convert research reactors from highly-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, the GHARR-1 fuel will be replaced by a core consisting of uranium dioxide (UO2 clad with Zircaloy-4 alloy) fuel pins with a nominal enrichment of 12.5 % and with maximum thermal power level of 34 kW to achieve the same flux for its utilization. Main properties of GHARR-1 are shown in Table 1 [10] . Fuel pins are arranged in 10 multi-concentric circle layers with the pitch distance of 10.95 mm. Due to the physical core design characterized by under-moderated system, a large negative temperature feedback coefficient of reactivity is achieved. The core region of GHARR-1 is located 4.7 m under water, close to the bottom of a watertight reactor vessel. The quantity of water is 1.5 m 3 in the vessel, which serves the purpose of radiation shielding, moderation and as primary heat transfer medium. In addition, heat can be extracted from the water in the vessel by means of a water-cooling coil located near the top of the vessel. The water-filled reactor vessel is in turn immersed in a water-filled pool of 30 m 3 .
Heat Removal from the core of GHARR-1
The heat generated by nuclear fission is conducted through the fuel meat to the fuel cladding, and transferred to the coolant by convection. Cold water is drawn through the inlet orifice by natural convection. The water flows past the hot fuel elements and comes out through the core outlet orifice. The hot water rises to mix with the large volume of water in the reactor vessel and to the cooling coil. Heat passes through the walls of the container to the pool water. In Figure 3 it can be seen how heat is removed from the core and the heat transfer mechanism. The core inlet flow orifice slows down the natural circulation of fluid through the core. 
Description of the Transient
The research reactor safety analysis calculations are simulated based on two selected broad accident categories, which are reactivity insertion accidents and loss-of-flow accidents (LOFAs).
Reactivity accidents analysis are carried out by systematically considering transients with and without scram events, known respectively as protected and unprotected transients or selflimited transients. Unprotected reactivity transients deal with determination of reactivity insertion limits imposed by clad melting temperature. On the other hand, the LOFA simulations have been limited to the investigation of protected transients only. With the reactor shutdown system enabled, all LOFA simulations predict that clad temperature will remain well below the clad melting point and that no flow instabilities takes place in the cooling channels. There are still limited data on reactor power and clad temperature responses in case of an unprotected event [12] .
Transient analysis of core blockage was performed using RELAP5-3D code, which is best estimate code. Although the exact probability of this event is unknown, it is assumed that it will not be as high as compared to the open pool configuration. The core blockage may happen as a result of fuel swelling or material falling inside the core to block the flow channel. The MNSR reactor has an upward flow and because of this, probability of fuel swelling to block the flow channel is much higher than the object blocking the flow, which may happen as a result of some object un-intentionally left in the flow channel during maintenance work. Also, since the reactor liquid flow is laminar and there are no external pumps, dragging material into the core is almost impossible.
In this study, the peak coolant channel of GHARR-1 MNSR reactor was blocked to prevent the flow of fluid into the core. This results in a loss of cooling in the reactor core due to blockage of the inner orifices of the coolant flow into the thermal-hydraulic channels. A valve was inserted at the peak channel to perform this blockage. The valve was closed at time 2000 s of calculation, after the system had reached steady-state condition. The transient was considered at maximum power of 34 kW.
CODE AND NODALIZATION
The RELAP5-3D thermal-hydraulic nodalization includes the whole MNSR system; the core, the vessel, and the surrounding pool as well as the reflectors. This nodalization was developed to carry out thermal hydraulics analysis of GHARR-1 MNSR for on-going core conversion from HEU to LEU. The peak pin coolant and the average pin coolant have the same coolant flow area per pin. In this model, the radial Be reflector transfers heat from the average pin coolant channel to the coolant down-flow. Perfect mixing of the coolant water was assumed as it emerges from the top of the core. Figure 4 shows RELAP5-3D nodalization of GHARR-1.
The power distribution in the core and the reactivity feedback coefficients needed for the calculation were calculated by using Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) transport code and validated with experimental data [11] . 
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ANALYSIS OF RESULTS
The GHARR-1 reactor core was designed to accommodate sufficient natural convective flow to maintain continuous flow of water throughout the core. The objective was to avoid significant boiling and to restrict possible steam bubbles on the fuel element surface.
In this study, blockage of the peak coolant channel was considered. The power for the transient was 34kW, as shown in Figure 5 . Steady state conditions were reached at 2000 s of calculation. The blockage was simulated by blocking the peak coolant channel completely at the beginning of the transient., and as a consequence there was no more fluid flow in this channel. During the transient, coolant temperature in the core increased and reached the point of saturation in about 250 s, after which it remained constant. Boiling occurred in peak coolant channel, as shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7 after the transient. These phenomena caused a decrease in mass flow, and oscillations of the void in the blocked channel. Figure 8 indicates the mass flow in the peak channel.
The limiting factor for the MNSR is the fuel temperature. The maximum fuel temperature should not result in too much stress to the Zr-4 alloy cladding of the LEU fuel. The temperature at which melting of the Zr-4 cladding will occur is 2123.15 K. It should also be noted that since the reactor has low power, the reactor transient cannot generate high enough temperature that lead to core meltdown. The calculated temperature, as can be seen on Figure 9 , was significantly lower than the melting temperature of the cladding, and with this it was shown that the considered transient will not pose any significant threat to the core.
As a safety measure, when the temperature difference between the inlet and outlet coolant of the reactor increases, the buoyancy and circulating head will increase to make the flow velocity rise, and in turn, limit the increase in power which will eventually shut down the reactor. 
CONCLUSIONS
Best Estimate code (RELAP5-3D) has been used to model GHARR-1 core. The input deck was obtained from GHARR-1 centre and was prepared by Argonne National Laboratory in support of the core conversion safety analysis from highly HEU to LEU.
Loss of coolant flow can lead to weak feedback effect which is related to plant thermal hydraulic events. Although boiling occurs in the reactor core after the transient, results of the GHARR-1 MNSR peak coolant channel blockage showed that the temperatures are within the safety limits. The results also showed that the temperatures of the cladding of peak coolant channel's fuel are below the melting point, therefore the reactor safety for the transient was confirmed.
BEPU approach could not be fully applied due to two main reasons:
1. the nodalization cannot be qualified because core was modelled with just two channels; peak channel and others as one which may not give an accurate result of the reactor's core blockage.
2. there was a insufficient data about the reactor to perform the uncertainty analysis which is the important part of BEPU approach.
The plan is to improve the model in future with coupling neutronic and thermal-hydraulic codes to obtain a more realistic results for this type of accident. More transient analysis should be done with a more qualified and more detailed nodalization that will better represent the GHARR-1 reactor. Therefore, there is a need for the development and qualification of a new nodalization before the BEPU approach can be fully applied.
